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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
THE FACEBOOK IPO’S FACE-OFF WITH DUAL CLASS 
STOCK STRUCTURE 
Anna S. Han* 
The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is 
premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media 
criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect 
shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not 
only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the 
footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google. 
A. THE FACEBOOK IPO 
The Facebook IPO is one of the most widely discussed and 
anticipated events in the U.S. financial and technology industries. 
Much media attention is devoted to the IPO’s positive economic 
and social impact—revitalizing the stock market and attracting 
young adults as potential investors are just a couple examples of 
such impact.1 There is a small but noticeable concern, however, 
regarding the future of Facebook’s corporate governance—
specifically, Mark Zuckerberg’s control of the company following 
the IPO.2 
While most private companies that go public choose a single-
class share structure whereby each share equals one vote, 
Facebook will emerge from the offering with its CEO as the 
                                                   
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. Michael Giles, Facebook IPO Will Bring a Whole New Generation to the Stock 
Market, HUFF POST MONEY (Mar. 6, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michae 
l-giles/facebook-ipo_b_1290659.html.  
2. See Leena Rao, Facebook’s S-1 and the Largest Shareholders, TECH. CRUNCH (Feb. 
1, 2012) [hereinafter Facebook’s S-1], http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/01/facebooks-s-1-and-
the-largest-shareholders-who-owns-what/; Claire Moore, Facebook IPO Slated to Be the 
Largest in History of Silicon Valley, ARRIVE PREPARED (Feb. 7, 2012), http://blog.highbeamb 
usiness.com/ 2012/02/facebook-ipo-slated-to-be-largest-in-history-of-silicon-valley-but-will-it-
make-you-rich/.  
J 
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controlling shareholder.3 Now that its financial statements are 
public (due to the Form S-1 that Facebook filed in compliance 
with federal securities regulations), all potential investors have 
access to information on Facebook’s current shareholder 
breakdown.4  Zuckerberg stands as, unsurprisingly, the largest 
shareholder with 28.2% of the company. Even though Zuckerberg 
will ultimately own only about a quarter of the company, SEC 
filings reveal he will still hold 57.1% of Facebook’s voting control 
after the IPO. He made this possible by first classifying Facebook 
as a “controlled company” and subsequently converting his shares 
into super-voting stock.5 This maneuver has spawned some 
controversy among followers of the Facebook IPO. Some applaud 
Zuckerberg’s actions as an enlightened corporate decision while 
others denounce it as risky, bringing up “the chance he’ll become 
some Mad King, succumbing to erratic rule somewhere down the 
line.”6  
The more immediate concern, however, is the impact this dual 
class voting structure will have on Facebook’s newly minted 
shareholders following the IPO. It will likely cause companies to 
divide ownership interests into different camps, with the 
possibility that “[t]hese early fractures can widen into fault lines, 
eventually resulting in a costly, distracting, and potentially 
unpopular restructuring.”7 In fact, as the influential proxy 
advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) warns, “the 
problems for both boards of directors and institutional investors 
… will begin the morning after the IPO, when divergent interests 
within the shareholder base have been institutionalized .…”8 In 
addition to preventing shareholders from voicing their opinions in 
a meaningful way, dual class structures highlight the collective 
                                                   
3. See Charley Moore, Should Mark Zuckerberg Think Twice About Establishing a 
Dynasty, TECH. CRUNCH (Feb. 11, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/11/mark-
zuckerberg-dynasty/; Facebook’s S-1, supra note 2. 
4. See Facebook’s S-1, supra note 2. 
5. See Moore, supra note 3.  
6. See Josh Constine, If Investors Want More Voting Rights, They Should Have 
Invested Facebook, TECH. CRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/14/facebo 
ok-voting-rights/.  
7. The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 
Feb. 13, 2012, at 3 [hereinafter Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons] , http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/ resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf.  
8. See id.  
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action problem borne out by shareholder passivity.9 One 
commentator notes that “[t]his passive behavior is thought to 
manifest itself when dispersed shareholders in large corporations 
realize that the costs associated with agent monitoring are solely 
incurred, while the returns are shared pro rata.”10 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DUAL CLASS STOCK STRUCTURE 
Shares of common stock have been historically understood to 
represent a bundle of rights, including the right to vote on 
corporate decisions. The one-share, one-vote rule emerged in the 
1800s as legislatures, suspicious of corporations, shifted the legal 
system away from imposing a maximum number of votes for any 
individual shareholder.11 By the mid-1900s, most U.S. corporations 
migrated to the one-share, one-vote rule.12 Because corporations 
were not required to adhere to the statutory standard, they started 
using nonvoting common stock to retain control after raising 
money in the public market.13 It soon became clear, around 1918, 
that a growing number of corporations started using two classes of 
stock—one class that obtained full voting rights, and another class 
that obtained no voting rights but gained the benefit of a 
potentially greater dividend payout.14 
Commonly known as Class A and Class B shares, the former 
are composed of preexisting common stock, while the latter 
include a proportionally larger amount of votes per share (usually 
10). Class B shares are typically not transferrable, but can be 
converted to Class A shares to be sold. The use of the separate 
classes declined during the Great Depression, but rebounded 
during the 1980s as hostile takeovers also became more 
prevalent.15 
When corporations started lobbying the NYSE and Amex to 
liberalize rules on shareholder voting rights, the SEC tried to 
promulgate a one-share, one-vote standard in the form of the 
                                                   
9. Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 906 
(1994).  
10. Id. at 907.  
11. Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting 
Rights 4 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4–537/4537–17.pdf.  
12. See id. at 5.  
13. See id. at 6.  
14. See id.  
15. See id. at 7.  
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failed Rule 19c-4.16 Rule 19c-4 attempted to bar companies listed 
on national securities exchanges from using super-voting classes 
of stock.17 The D.C. Circuit, deciding not to venture into a realm 
already governed by state corporate law and stock exchanges, 
struck down the rule in Business Roundtable v. SEC.18 
C. THE ARGUMENT FOR DUAL CLASS STOCK STRUCTURE 
Shareholder rights activists and advocates argue that dual 
class structures pose many potential harms to effective corporate 
governance. For one thing, as the ISS made clear while 
lambasting Facebook’s corporate governance choice,19 dual class 
structures may weaken incentives for shareholder control.20  This 
means that the more separation of control there is between the 
investor and her shares, the less motivated she is to manage the 
rights that are attached to the equity. On the other side of the 
same problem is entrenchment risk.21 The more separated the 
non-controlling shareholder is from her interests, the higher the 
probability that her interests will not be protected. Finally, 
scholars have pointed out that dual class structures pose a higher 
risk that controlling shareholders will be further incentivized to 
extract other internal private benefits of control.22 The idea here is 
that controlling shareholders enjoy benefits from their controlling 
position, while minority shareholders receive a disproportionate 
share of those benefits. 
These views have their vociferous advocates, but a survey of 
the academic literature and studies across the board show that the 
presumed negative effect of dual class stock structures is far from 
certain.23 First and foremost, corporate law scholars generally do 
                                                   
16. Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting 
Rights 8-9 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4–537/4537–17.pdf.   
17. Id. at 7-9.  
18. See id. at 9.  
19. See Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons, supra note 7, at 1.  
20. Karl Hofstetter, One Size Does Not Fit All: Corporate Governance for “Controlled 
Companies”, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 597, 649 (2006).  
21. See id.  
22. See id.  
23. See generally Ashton, supra note 9 (analyzing policy positions of the SEC, NYSE, 
and NASD with respect with dual class common stock); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: 
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 76 
(1988) (arguing that the New York Stock Exchange should forbid recapitalizations with 
dual class common stock); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection 
of Sec Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 579 (1991).  
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not consider dual class structures associated with IPOs to be 
disenfranchising.24 With the proper disclosure, shareholders are 
on notice that the founding entrepreneurs exchange a penalty in 
the form of a lower price per share for access to equity markets 
without the dilution of control.25 Potential shareholders can then 
decide for themselves whether or not to purchase the shares. 
Because a company seeking to register its securities on the market 
discloses this information up front, there is minimal risk of 
investor coercion. In Facebook’s case, the media makes this 
information highly public—and thus widely disclosed—in every 
instance it makes Facebook’s dual class structure the source of the 
IPO’s controversy. 
The illusion of shareholder disenfranchisement aside, sound 
economic justifications exist for implementing a dual class stock 
structure. In the face of hostile takeovers, for example, a dual class 
stock structure “can protect outside shareholders from coercive 
takeover tactics….”26 For example, collective action problems 
prevent the many shareholders from acting in concert, 
dampening their negotiating power. A dual class structure steps in 
by forcing bidders to deal with a single controlling group, which 
has the effect of increasing the power of all shareholders.27 
Another significant reason founders choose the dual class 
structure to begin with is to lower the risk of takeovers. A dual 
class structure reduces the likelihood that shareholders will flip 
their shares over to a purchaser who then attains control over the 
company and removes the incumbent.28 Without the dual class 
structure, managers who foresee—mistakenly or accurately—a 
takeover and potential removal may have less incentive to invest 
time and money in the company, thereby leaving open the 
possibility of a lowering of the company’s value. 
Current regulations provide enough protections for investors 
of public companies.29 The media and the ISS worry that the 
Facebook IPO’s dual class structure will disenfranchise future non-
controlling shareholders. However, they need not fret. Even 
without economic justifications and theoretical studies, a look at 
                                                   
24. See Ashton, supra note 9, at 876.  
25. See id. at 884.  
26. See id. at 923.  
27. See id.  
28. See id.  
29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).  
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the experience of a similarly positioned company, Google,30 offers 
proof that a dual class stock structure does not necessarily wield 
such destructive power. Facebook will likely follow a similar path 
to overwhelming financial and social success, dual class structure 
notwithstanding.  
                                                   
30. See Dual-Class Share Structures - The Cost of Control, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 23, 
2011, at 65, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18988938.  
